The article gives an appraisal of the last years" development in criminal matters in the European Union and answers the question if an integrative "European Criminal Law" already exists. Against this background, the "Lisbon Judgment" of the Federal Constitutional Court is analyzed and the basic guidelines of the judgment regarding criminal law are elaborated. The article also explains the requirements made by the Federal Constitutional Court on the decisions on punishable behavior, on the rank of legally protected interests and on the meaning of threat of punishment. Based on this, the additional value of a supranational public prosecution is discussed, as well as some ways in which criminal law influences the cultural identity of European nations.
Europäische Einigung und Europäisches Strafrecht. Beiträge zum Gründungssymposium der Vereinigung für Europäisches Strafrecht e.V. (European unification and European Criminal Law. Papers written on the occasion of the symposium to celebrate the foundation of the incorporated Association for European
Law) (Köln, Berlin, Bonn, München: Carl Heymanns, 1993) . 6 See, for Germany, e.g. Volker Stiebig, supra note 5: 466-467; Oliver Suhr, "Strafrechtsharmonisierung in der Europäischen Union. Neue Grenzziehungen und zusätzliche Kontrollaufträge" (Approximation of criminal laws in the European Union. New delineations and additional mandates for scrutiny), Zeitschrift für europarechtliche Studien 21 Cf. Oliver Suhr, supra note 6: 46-48. 22 The Gesamtbetrachtung (overall view), e.g., which is applied by the ECHR within the consideration of evidence, is interpreted differently; see Jan Dehne-Niemann, ""Nie sollst Du mich befragen′ -Zur Behandlung des Rechts zur Konfrontation mitbeschuldigter Belastungszeugen (Art. 6 Abs. 25 (criminal law network). In the meantime, this has turned out to be a self-ruling apparatus lacking a sufficient legitimation. 26 In the eyes of the European public, the function of criminal law is noticed less as an instrument of sanctioning than as a provider of social control. 27 However, its coercive measures are applied rather selectively where assumed to be opportune. 28 The European citizen often feels helpless in the face of a European legal system detached from national necessities. 29 European criminal law, therefore, has begun to take on a life of its own especially in the recent past. The reasons for the supranational level removing from the national level are manifold. The principle of conferral 30 enables national constitutional courts to concede political leeway depending on national requirements.
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The scientific discussion of "European Criminal Law" in Germany as a solution for cross-border problems started in the beginning of the 1950s. 32 In German literature, already in 2002, there was asserted that a European criminal law is taken as a given. 33 Meanwhile, the process of Europeanization cannot be held back in substantive and procedural criminal law any longer. 34 In additional problems in understanding the grounds of the judgment. 47 The grounds contain, inter alia, explanations which expose the basic importance of substantive and procedural criminal law. The judgment has been discussed as controversial. 48 The initial point for the Constitutional Court"s argumentation is the appraisal that the European Union, even if the Lisbon Treaty comes into force, at its present integration status does not correspond to a standard of legitimation of a constitutional democracy. 49 The Lisbon Treaty had decided against the idea of a
European federal constitution scheduling a European parliament as an organ of representation. 50 Therefore, the German Federal Parliament -not the government 51 -took still center stage in an interdependent democratic system. 52 Being an alliance which possesses legal personality, the European Union, however, had been created by sovereign democratic states. 53 The present integration status did not require the European institutional system to be organized as an entity modeled on a national state system.
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The initial point for the considerations concerning criminal law is the principle of conferral located in the first sentence of the first paragraph and in the second 
Still, the Federal Constitutional Court denies the European Union a
Kompetenz-Kompetenz, i.e. the power to determine its own powers. 57 The German
Constitution did not allow the Kompetenz-Kompetenz to be delegated to the Union. 58 Nevertheless, German constitutional law permitted competences to be conferred to the Union to a large extent. 59 The act of delegation had to take place in a factually limited manner. 60 Furthermore, it was necessary that, in principle, it may be cancelled. 61 For that, the secession of a member state from the European integration system was not to be prevented by other member states or the Union itself. 62 The principle of conferral, therefore, was not only a European law principle but incorporated principles of the member state constitutions. (2) Criminal law guarantees a minimum of legal ethics.
With respect to the first point, the Federal Constitutional Court considers criminal law as an indispensable device to keep the legal order steadfast. 67 To which extent and in which fields a political community uses precisely criminal law as an instrument of social control was a decision of fundamental importance. 68 A community based on law, by means of criminal law, created a code of behavior; its violation, in accordance with the common conviction, was considered so serious and so intolerable when living together that it had to be prosecuted. 69 With regard to the second point, the Constitutional Court refers to the sensitiveness of democratic self-determination concerning matters of criminal law. The utilization of criminal law instruments requires a special justification. 73 That Article 82, paragraphs 1 and 2 and Article 83, paragraphs 1 and 2 TFEU have to be construed restrictively is proven by the "emergency brake" (Notbremse) 74 .
According to the so-called emergency brake, the Constitutional Court gives the national legislator and legal practitioner enough scope to consider national cultural norms by demanding only a minimum of legal ethics. As a result, the competences of the Union are interpreted in a restrictive manner in order to save national merits (requirement of protection -Schonungsgebot).
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The Constitutional Court relocates decision-making processes at the national level by confirming the principle of conferral and reserving an ultra vires control if legal protection cannot be reached on the European level. 90 Thus, the court compensates the Union"s deficit of democracy 91 and takes into account the increasing speed of Europeanization devoid of an adequate democratic fundament.
Such democratic legitimation has to usher from a self-determined people. 92 In fact,
The guarantee in perpetuity (Ewigkeitsgarantie) located in Article 79, paragraph 3 of the German Constitution was meant as a steadfast principle by the constitution-drafters. Hence, it must not be touched by European endeavors for unification.
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CONCLUSIONS
In opposition to many skeptics, the Federal Constitutional Court has applied a standard that does not focus on abstract conceptions but, rather, human interests. 100 It remains doubtful if the foundation of a European federal state would resolve the aspects broached in the judgment. 101 It is not even certain if such a supranational construct would be appreciated by the member states. 102 In terms of criminal law, it remains to be discussed whether fields of policy exist which, in any circumstances, have to remain on the operating level of the member states, be it because they cannot be treated appropriately on the European level or because those fields have to be regarded as indispensable to national efficiency. 103 From the present view, an approximation of criminal laws carries the
